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MOre THAN INSPIreD PrOPOSITIONS: 
SHAreD ATTeNTION AND THe reLIgIOuS TexT
Adam green and Keith A. Quan
The Christian intellectual tradition consistently affirms that God is present 
in and continues to speak through Scripture. These functions of the Chris-
tian Scriptures have been underexamined in contemporary philosophy of 
religion and philosophical theology. Careful attention to the phenomenon of 
shared attention is instructive for providing an account of these matters, and 
the shared attention account developed here provides a useful conceptual 
framework within which to situate recent work on Scripture by scholars 
such as Kevin Vanhoozer, Nicholas Wolterstorff, and Michael Rea.
Contemporary philosophical discussion of the nature and functions of 
a religious text have typically been concerned with whether or not some 
propositions contained in holy writ are true and with how one may or 
may not be justified in thinking those propositions true. One may also be 
concerned with whether or not the presence of redactors, a distant histori-
cal context, or the literary features of a text ought to affect one’s reliance 
on Scripture as a source of true propositions. In Christian analytic phi-
losophy, the focal question has been whether a personal God underwrote 
the truth of some or all of the propositions expressed by the Bible and 
whether we can come to know these propositions through some kind of 
historical argument, through testimony, or through an inkling to believe 
implanted in our hearts by the Holy Spirit.
In this paper, we want to focus attention on an epistemic function 
of an inspired religious text other than that of making true statements. 
Instead, our focus is on the way in which an inspired text facilitates 
acquaintance knowledge of the divine and propositional knowledge 
that builds on that acquaintance knowledge. We shall be offering a tax-
onomy of different ways in which Scripture can facilitate experiences 
of the divine that draws on work in developmental psychology, and we 
shall parlay that taxonomy into an account that sheds light on aspects of 
Scripture that are underexamined in contemporary Christian philoso-
phy of religion and philosophical theology. We shall be operating in the 
Christian tradition, though parallel points might be made in a variety 
of traditions.
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I
While there have been numerous volumes debating the authority and in-
spiration of Scripture, there has been relatively little extended reflection 
on what is one of the most pervasive affirmations about Scripture in the 
Christian theological tradition, that Scripture mediates experiences of 
God. In the reading and proclamation of Scripture, believers do not merely 
encounter words about God, but in some way encounter God Himself.
Consider, for example, the Reformed theologian Herman Bavinck, who 
wrote:
Scripture was written by the Holy Spirit that it might serve him in guiding 
the church, in the perfecting of the saints, in the building up of the body 
of Christ. In it God daily comes to his people. In it he speaks to his people, 
not from afar but from nearby. In it he reveals himself, from day to day, to 
believers in the fullness of his grace and truth. Through it he works his 
miracles of compassion and faithfulness. Scripture is the ongoing rapport 
between heaven and earth, between Christ and his church, between God 
and his children. It does not just tie us to the past; it binds us to the living 
Lord in the heavens. It is the living voice of God, the letter of the omnipo-
tent god to his creature.1
This quotation illustrates some interrelated motifs found across the 
Christian theological tradition. Scripture is not merely God’s past speech, 
but rather is the “living voice of God” through which He continues to 
address His people. As Paul Scherer, a Lutheran preacher, once noted, 
“God did not stop speaking when his book went to press.”2 Furthermore, 
Scripture mediates God’s presence as He “daily comes to his people.” Ac-
cording to the Sacrosanctum Concilium of the Catholic Church, “He [Christ] 
is present in His word, since it is He Himself who speaks when the holy 
scriptures are read in the Church.”3 As Barth argues, Scripture is the place 
where God meets His people:
The fact of the canon tells us simply that the church has regarded these 
scriptures as the place where we can expect to hear the voice of God. The 
proper attitude of preachers does not depend on whether they hold on to a 
doctrine of inspiration but on whether or not they expect God to speak to 
them here.4
1Herman Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, ed. John Bolt, trans. John Vriend, vol. 1 (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2003), 385.
2Quoted without citation in Elizabeth Achtemeier, “The Canon as the Voice of the Liv-
ing God,” in Reclaiming the Bible for the Church, ed. Carl E. Braaten and Robert W. Jenson 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1995), 122.
3Sacrosanctum Concilium 7 [online at http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_ 
vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_const_19631204_sacrosanctum-concilium_en.html]. 
Given that the context of the quotation is emphasizing the presence of Christ in the Church’s 
liturgy and sacraments and the Catholic theology of the sacraments, there is every reason 
to believe that this comment is meant quite literally.
4Karl Barth, Homiletics, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley and Donald E. Daniels (Louisville, 
KY: Westminster John Knox, 1991), 78.
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These motifs also appear in the writings of the luminaries of the theo-
logical tradition. For example, according to Luther, when one hears Scrip-
ture proclaimed one encounters God Himself: “It is God himself who is 
speaking when it is God’s Word which someone uses to comfort you, and if 
it is God’s Word, then God is acting here, so remember that God himself is 
doing it.”5 Expressing it more vividly, Luther says that even though Christ 
“has ascended to heaven and no longer preaches on earth in person,” He 
still “wanders through the world unceasingly, preaching His Gospel until 
the Last Day.”6 Elsewhere he compares the oral word, the proclamation of 
the Gospel from the Scriptures, to the Old Testament tabernacle; both are 
divinely ordained “physical signs” by which one can “recognize and find 
God.”7 Similarly, for Calvin, the proclamation of Scripture functions as a 
“sure and infallible sign” that God is “near at hand to us, . . . that he seeks 
our salvation, that he calls us to himself as though he spoke with open 
mouth, and that we see him personally before us.”8
Such claims are not limited to the modern period. As Augustine says in 
commentary on the Psalms:
Notice this, brothers and sisters, God never tires of addressing us. If he 
speaks to us no longer, what are we doing? What is the point of our holy 
readings, our sacred songs? But he continues to speak to us, so forget what 
lies behind and stretch out to what is ahead of you.9
The point of reading Scripture, amongst other things, is precisely that 
God continues to address believers through the text. One might readily 
think of the stories of Antony and Augustine in book eight of Confessions; 
just as Antony, upon reading Scripture, “felt that he was being admon-
ished as though what he read was spoken directly to himself” so also 
Augustine is divinely converted through the reading of a text of Scripture 
in the famous garden scene, which he takes to be intended for him at that 
exact moment.10
Given these widespread affirmations in the tradition about Scripture 
mediating experiences of God and God’s continuing address through such 
5As translated in Robert Kolb and Charles P. Arand, The Genius of Luther’s Theology: A 
Wittenberg Way of Thinking for the Contemporary Church (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 
2008), 179, from Martin Luther, D. Martin Luthers Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe, 127 vols. 
(Weimar: Hermann Böhlaus Nachfolger, 1883–1993), 46:150.20–26 and 150.33–38.
6Martin Luther, Luther’s Works, 55 vols. (St. Louis and Minneapolis: Concordia and For-
tress, 1958–1986), 13:324. While such vivid language could be taken to indicate that Luther 
is being metaphorical, Luther’s other affirmations of continuing divine speech through the 
proclamation of Scripture consistently use the emphatic “God himself” and phrases such 
as “as a matter of fact” and “but I view the picture correctly” (e.g., 22:526–27, 23:97–98). 
7Ibid., 27:60.20–23. 
8From sermon twenty-five of John Calvin, Sermons on the Epistle to the Ephesians, trans. 
Arthur Golding (Edinburgh: The Banner of Truth, 1973).
9Augustine, Expositions of the Psalms 121–150, ed. Boniface Ramsey, trans. Maria Bould-
ing, OSB., vol. III/20 of The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century, ed. 
John Rotelle, OSA (Hyde Park, NY: New City, 2004), 153. 
10Augustine, Confessions, trans. F. J. Sheed (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993), 146–147.
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experiences, it is surprising how relatively undeveloped the idea is com-
pared to discussions of the authority, inspiration, and even perspicuity of 
Scripture. What it means for Scripture to mediate encounters with God 
is by no means obvious, however. It is less than clear what exactly these 
motifs referenced above mean or how they relate to one another. What 
does seem clear is that the tradition is affirming more than that one may 
encounter God in Scripture in the same sense that one might encounter 
Plato in reading The Republic or that Scripture is inherently impactful in 
the same manner that Hetty’s story in Adam Bede is inherently impactful.
To lay the foundation for our account of these matters, we shall turn to 
developmental psychology and the phenomenon of shared attention.
II
Shared attention occurs when one is engaged in an act of attending to 
something and, in doing so, one is cooperating with another who is en-
gaged in a parallel act of attending.11 Shared attention involves coordinated 
“attention-focusing”12 where the coordination is present in the qualitative 
feel of the experience. Shared attention can involve a primary focus on the 
person or persons one is cooperating with or on an independent object or 
event. This distinction will be kept track of by distinguishing dyadic and 
triadic forms of shared attention.13 In dyadic shared attention, the partici-
pants focus attention on one another, and in triadic shared attention, both 
participants focus on an independent object or event.
The following three stage example of a ten-month-old and its mother 
interacting illustrates the phenomena. First, the child looks the mother in 
the eye. Second, the child turns and points to a bright object. Third, the 
child looks back at the mother to see that she has followed the direction 
of the point. If the mother has cooperated with the pointing of the child, 
then the child and the mother had dyadic shared attention at stage one, 
and triadic shared attention at stage two. At stage three, the child checks 
to make sure that stage two has been successful, to make sure that the 
mother really is attending to the object with the infant.
As Ingrid Brinck points out, the phenomenon in question is more than 
“mutual object-focusing” because “the subjects will have to attend to each 
other as capable of attending in a goal-intended way, that is, in a way 
11A similar description of shared attention one sometimes sees is “acting in concert with 
responsive partners,” (Vasudevi Reddy, “Before the ‘Third Element’: Understanding At-
tention to Self,” in Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds, ed. Naomi Elian et al. 
[Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005], 262.) but this description seems to allow for satisfaction 
by actions such as participating in an organized military strike. It does not capture the fact 
that in shared attention the attending is what is shared.
12Ingar Brinck, “Attention and the Evolution of Intentional Communication,” Pragmatics 
and Cognition 9:2 (2001), 262.
13It should be noted that these labels pick out how many types of thing are involved in a 
sharing of attention, not how many objects or persons. One can have dyadic attention with 
more than one person in principle, or may have triadic shared attention where the object of 
attention is a class of objects.
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that is not controlled by the object of attention.” If a zebra follows the 
startled gaze of the zebra beside it to see a lion in the distance, that does 
not qualify by itself as shared attention because the joint behavior is not 
an instance of cooperative attending. In the pointing example, the aware-
ness of the bright object is evidenced by the point, and the mother attends 
to the bright object because the child manifests a desire for the parent to 
attend to the bright object to which the child was attending. If the child 
tries to check the gaze of the mother in stage three only to find that the 
mother has silently left the room, the child’s experience of attending to 
the object in stage two will seem to have been a different experience than 
it initially appeared to be.14 Similarly, if one points to an object and then 
subsequently figures out that the other person’s subsequent looking was 
not done in response to one’s pointing, one will have an experience as of 
having experienced an illusion. The cooperation of the other in attending 
is a phenomenal constituent of the experience of shared attention itself.
R. Peter Hobson argues from his research with autistic children that 
the shared attention impairment in the autistic is rooted in an inability 
to enter into intersubjective engagement through recognizing the expres-
sion of attitudes in bodily cues.15 Borrowing from Wittgenstein, Hobson 
characterizes the activity that makes intersubjective engagement possible 
as a kind of perception. He writes, “perception is relational, and to per-
ceive a smile as a smile . . . is to respond with feeling, in such a way that 
through the smile one apprehends the emotional state of the other.”16
On Hobson’s model, attitudes “are manifest in bodily expressions, ori-
entations, and actions.”17 The idea is that, unless one has a related im-
pairment like autism, one can naturally perceive some mental states by 
perceiving the physical expressions of those states.18 The perception of 
mental states makes one available to share attention with the other. The 
infant involved in dyadic shared attention can literally see that the other is 
responding cooperatively to her attention, perhaps through the combina-
tion of the other’s gaze and the pattern of affect displayed by herself and 
the other person.
In triadic shared attention, generally a dyadic stage of mental state per-
ception allows one to perceive the intention of the other to cooperate with 
one in attending to some other thing. Consequently, when one attends 
to the third thing, one is aware of oneself as engaging in a cooperative 
14For an extended discussion of this feature of shared attention, see John Campbell, 
“Joint Attention and Common Knowledge,” in Elian et al., Joint Attention: Communication 
and Other Minds.
15R. Peter Hobson, “What Puts the Jointness Into Joint Attention?” in Elian et al., Joint 
Attention: Communication and Other Minds, 198ff. See also, R. Peter Hobson, The Cradle of 
Thought: Exploring the Origins of Thinking (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
16Hobson, “What Puts the Jointness,” 190.
17Ibid., 186.
18For a defense of this claim, see Adam Green, “Perceiving Persons,” Journal of Conscious-
ness Studies, forthcoming.
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enterprise, and the discovery that there was no cooperation would reveal 
that some of the success conditions of one’s attentional state failed to hold. 
Thus, the experience will be revealed to have misrepresented reality even 
though the same sensory information may be coming to one by way of 
the third object.
The abilities that one acquires as shared attention develops can come 
to be employed in many situations that deviate from the developmental 
scenario, including cases that do not satisfy the criterion for shared atten-
tion. For example, if Rachael Ray is on television and asks one to attend to 
the golden brown crust of her zucchini bake, one can cooperate with her 
wish in a way that is different from merely following her gaze to what she 
happens to be looking at. One is cooperating with her attempt to direct the 
attention of her viewers. The abilities that enable joint attention are at work, 
even though they are operating in an artificial extension of their natural 
environment. One still uses the pattern of Rachael’s visible behavior to co-
ordinate one’s attention with her directing of that attention, but one doesn’t 
enter into the sort of dyadic state that the mother and baby from the previ-
ous example do. One attends to something in a cooperative mode, but the 
state that comes about when one attends to the zucchini bake because of 
Rachael is not one where she is cooperating with and aware of one in a way 
that’s parallel to the way one is cooperating with and aware of her.
III
There are various ways in which a written text may couple with one’s 
abilities to engage in shared attention. Consider two permutations of the 
Rachael Ray case and the ways in which each of them compare to the 
standard case of shared attention illustrated by the mother and the child.
Case 1
Becky likes to cook along with the Rachael Ray show. The show is on 
the Spanish-speaking channel during her dinner hour, and Becky does 
not speak Spanish, so she follows the English subtitles. When Ray says 
“Consider the golden brown crust of this zucchini bake” Becky is able 
to use her abilities to engage in shared attention as mediated by the 
subtitles to attend to the zucchini bake pictured on the screen. She then 
imagines what Rachael Ray would say about the zucchini bake that 
Becky is cooking and is led to look at the crust of her own zucchini 
bake, pondering whether it is golden brown as it should be.
Case 2
Alex wins a private cooking lesson with Rachael Ray. He is deaf, so 
Rachael communicates with him using written notes. At a certain 
point in the lesson, she hands him a note that reads, “Consider the 
golden brown crust of this zucchini bake,” at which point he attends 
with Rachael to the crust. He looks back at Rachael who smiles and 
holds out a note between them that reads, “You done good.”
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Both of these cases illustrate how a line of written text may interface 
with the interactive ability one displays when one engages in shared at-
tention. In the first case, Becky must use some of the same abilities that 
subserve shared attention in order to follow Rachael Ray’s directions, 
though Ray is not actually present for Becky to share attention with and 
Becky does not take the episode to be one of sharing attention. It could 
be, however, that watching the television would be insufficient to direct 
Becky’s attention without the help of the subtitles. Becky is able to rec-
ognize the way the subtitle is supposed to couple with her experience of 
the video. Becky’s ability to cooperate with the subtitled video not only 
allows her to look at what Ray wants her audience to look at, but it also 
allows her to navigate her own environment in a new way in light of what 
she observes on the video and reads in the subtitles.
In the second case, Alex does enjoy shared attention with Rachael Ray. 
This shared attention is facilitated by the notes that she writes for him. 
The first note serves a function much like an infant’s pointing a finger at 
an object to which it wants its mother to attend. The note makes clear that 
Rachael would like Alex to attend to the color of the bake. The first note fa-
cilitates triadic shared attention. The second note shapes an experience of 
dyadic shared attention. It helps Alex construe Rachael’s smiling at Alex 
in the proper way. These two notes are partly constitutive of experiences 
of shared attention of the triadic and dyadic variety respectively. They 
constitute part of the cooperative activity between Rachael and Alex that 
is experienced as shared.
It is important to distinguish two different ways in which a written text 
can facilitate dyadic or triadic shared attention. The first is by being partly 
constitutive of the cooperative activity registered as a shared experience. 
The second is by being solely instrumental to the experience occurring. 
For example, if Rachael Ray hands Alex a note that says, “My producer 
Buddy is in the next room and he wants to give you a new blender,” Alex 
may then be empowered by the note to have dyadic and triadic shared 
experiences with Buddy, but the note is not part of any cooperative activ-
ity shared by Alex and Buddy. The note is only a means of putting Alex 
in a position to engage in shared attention with Buddy. The note is doing 
more than the subtitles in the first case, however. Buddy is an agent that is 
represented as being proximal and available for sharing attention.
These cases should not be thought to be exhaustive of the ways in which 
a written text may productively combine with one’s ability to engage in 
shared attention. What we hope to have drawn attention to is a number 
of ways in which a written text may partner with these abilities and, in 
fact, may play a critical role in facilitating genuine shared attention. We 
are now in a position to draw up a rough taxonomy. The written text may 
facilitate pseudo-shared attention or genuine shared attention. Pseudo-
shared attention does not necessarily produce an illusion, just as watching 
Rachael Ray on the television need not be accompanied by an impression 
that one is sharing attention with Rachael Ray. Rather, pseudo-shared 
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attention occurs when one processes an input in an “as if” mode (e.g., “as 
if” the person on the TV were present). Processing something in an “as 
if” mode can take a more passive form, as when Becky watches the televi-
sion, or a more active form, as when Becky imagines Ray in Becky’s own 
kitchen. A written text can facilitate genuine shared attention in either a 
constitutive way or a merely instrumental way and shared attention can 
come in a dyadic or triadic variety.
Coupling of Shared Attention 





















The foregoing taxonomy suggests a corresponding taxonomy in the 
case of the divine and the inspired religious text. For each pairing of a 
text and a use of that text that depends on one’s ability to engage in shared 
attention, there is a corollary experience in which the text is Scripture and 
the agents involved are oneself and the divine. One’s interpretation of 
what it might mean for the divine to continue to speak through the Scrip-
tures and to be present in the Scriptures will be more metaphorical to the 
extent that the relevant function of Scripture is associated with the left 
side of the diagram and more literal to the extent that one associates the 
relevant function of Scripture with the right side of the diagram.
To illustrate different ways in which one may have an experience in an 
“as if” mode that incorporates Scripture, consider the many different ways 
in which one might approach the healing of the paralytic in the second 
chapter of the gospel of Mark. One might simply read this as a putative 
record of what was said on a particular occasion. One might also read the 
line in a tacitly or explicitly “as if” mode. One could read the line imagin-
ing oneself as if one is in the room for this healing. One might imagine the 
scene as it unfolds simply in virtue of reading a narrative without even 
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realizing that one is engaging the text imaginatively. One might also inten-
tionally imagine oneself as one of the characters, perhaps as the paralytic 
having a dyadic experience with Jesus that is shaped by the surprising 
announcement that one’s sins have been forgiven. One could also read the 
words “Son, your sins are forgiven” as if they are being spoken into one’s 
present situation quite independently of the first century context of the 
story. Once again, all of these “as if” modes of approaching the text may be 
more active or passive, tacit or explicit, voluntary or involuntary. One may 
realize that one is using an “as if” mode of cognition or one may mistake 
one’s experience for an actual one.
Each of these “as if” experiences could rely on the offline application 
of the skills that allow one to engage in social interaction in general and 
shared attention in particular. Imagining oneself into the position of the 
paralytic or imagining what it would look like for God to speak these 
lines into one’s present situation involves imagining oneself into a dy-
adic encounter that is rendered intelligible partly by relying on one’s prior 
knowledge of what such an encounter might be like. Even taking the im-
plicit stance of the onlooker in reading the paralytic’s story draws from 
one’s ability to imagine and interpret social scenarios much like Becky 
does when she cooks along with Rachael Ray.
On the one hand, it should not be controversial that we can engage in 
“as if” cognition based on Scripture because we can do so with almost 
any text. There is no reason that one cannot imaginatively experience 
Dostoevsky’s Raskilinokov in the same way one imaginatively encoun-
ters Jesus or Peter. Furthermore, interpreting the facilitation of acquain-
tance knowledge through Scripture in terms of “as if” experiences is 
inclusive. One need not have the esoteric experiences of the mystic in 
order to make use of Scripture in this way, and the writers surveyed 
in the first section of the paper appear to have a wide class of people 
in mind. In the Scriptures, God “daily comes to His people,” not some 
especially intuitive or holy subset thereof. Insistence on the usefulness 
of an imaginative encounter with Scripture is seen in figures as diverse 
as Ignatius of Loyola and Samuel Taylor Coleridge.19 Moreover, one can 
imagine “as if” experiences leading to genuine experiences of the divine, 
helping to facilitate acquaintance knowledge of the divine. If one looks 
at one’s life as if the divine is present, such a cognitive attitude may well 
prime one to encounter the actual presence of the divine.
One further virtue of thinking of Scripture as designed for use with 
pseudo-shared attention is that it would help to explain features of the 
Scriptures that might otherwise prove puzzling, such as the prominence 
of narratives about flawed human beings. A story lends itself to imagina-
tive engagement, and the presence of characters with whom one can iden-
tify enhances one’s ability to engage the text imaginatively. If the purpose 
19For a novel, contemporary take on the role of imagination in Scripture reading, see 
Gregory Boyd, Seeing is Believing (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 2004).
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of Scripture is all and only to convey correct doctrine, one might find the 
prevalence of narratives about fallen human beings at best excessive, but, 
if the text is meant to lend itself to imaginative identification, a narrative 
format of this type is only to be expected. In fact, the diversity in the for-
mats, styles, and perspectives of the Scripture makes sense if one thinks of 
the document as being intended to facilitate imaginative engagement for a 
maximally diverse audience across the lifespans of that diverse audience.
On the other hand, the presence and continuing speaking of Scripture 
witnessed to by the Christian tradition is not naturally parsed in terms 
of “as if” experiences alone. One could have an “as if” experience of Plato 
when reading the Republic, and one could look out at the world as if it was 
animated by Hegel’s zeitgeist. The Christian tradition appears to assert 
that Scripture is unique in that God is actually present and speaking in 
Scripture, not just that Scripture lends itself toward imagining that God 
is present and speaking.
If Scripture is meant to facilitate genuine shared attention in a more 
direct fashion, the instrumental reading of Scripture’s role is the less con-
troversial one. On this way of thinking about things, Scripture is like 
a note alerting one to the presence of an agent in one’s environment. 
Whereas an “as if” experience need not have the facilitation of genuine 
acquaintance in its success conditions, this is not the case for the instru-
mental reading. A note alerting one to the presence of an agent who 
wants to share attention can be effective only if there actually is such an 
agent and shared attention with that agent is possible. Thus, the connec-
tion between the instrumental reading and acquaintance knowledge of 
the divine is stronger than it is on the “as if” reading.
The instrumental reading also shares in the virtues of the “as if” read-
ing to some extent. No special pleading is necessary for the claim that a 
religious text can be designed to facilitate shared attention instrumentally. 
Even an atheist might allow that Scripture is designed to direct one towards 
encountering a divine being. The atheist would simply not grant that such 
a being exists. When the psalmist writes, “Taste and see that the Lord is 
good,” it represents the world as being a place that includes a divine being 
whose goodness is available for the experiencing.
Scripture being instrumental for facilitating shared attention still 
appears to fall short of God being present in and continuing to speak 
through Scripture, however. Compare an instrumental use of Scripture 
with an ordinary case. If one is handed a note asserting that a gentleman 
in a fedora is looking at one, that note need not come from the gentleman 
in the fedora. It might be a warning, “Watch out! There is a gentleman in a 
fedora watching you!” The note’s alerting one to the presence of an agent 
with whom one could share attention is not by itself a reason to think 
that the agent in question is attempting to be present and speak to one, let 
alone that the agent is successful in doing so. Similarly, if Scripture facili-
tates shared attention instrumentally, it does not follow thereby that God 
is present in and speaking through Scripture.
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If Scripture plays a role in facilitating shared attention with God by 
partly constituting the sharing of attention, one has a straightforward way 
of accommodating the idea that God’s presence is mediated by the text. 
Much like Rachael Ray hands Alex a note about the zucchini bake to direct 
his attention to the zucchini bake in Case 2, so God might, through the 
Scriptures, direct one’s attention to one’s pride. Just as Ray hands Alex a 
note saying he “done good” that shapes how Alex experiences Ray’s kindly 
smile, so God might elect for the contents of Scripture to shape a dyadic 
experience of the divine. Shared attention requires that the agent one is 
sharing attention with be experienced as present, even if implicitly. Thus, 
the constitutive reading draws a tight link between the role that the text 
plays in facilitating shared attention and God’s being present. Given this 
link, the constitutive reading seems best positioned to take the presence of 
God in the Scripture and His continuing speech through Scripture at face 
value. On the constitutive reading, the text can be as intimately involved 
in the sharing of attention as a point or a recognizable facial expression.
One might object to the constitutive reading on the grounds that the 
Scriptures do not read like a text written to a modern reader for the pur-
pose of sharing attention with that reader. One might think it strains cre-
dulity, for instance, for Paul’s personal notes to Philemon or Titus to be 
construed as also being personal communiques for oneself. Likewise, on 
the face of it, the various texts of Scripture address particular or general 
audiences. Twenty-first-century goyim are at best part of the general audi-
ence of the text and at worst are unintended onlookers.
These are only surface problems, however, for two reasons. First, 
shared attention can involve more than two participants. This is perhaps 
easiest seen with triadic shared attention. Just as an infant can point out a 
bright object to its mother so it can do the same for both of its parents. The 
number of participants who can share attention is restricted only by the 
cognitive limitations of the participants, and the complexity of the shared 
attention that may be possible for an infinite being should be enough to 
undercut this problem. Second, it is possible for a text to constitute part of 
a shared attention experience without having been penned for that pur-
pose. Just as one person might use a sonnet of Shakespeare’s as part of 
a dyadic expression of love for another despite Shakespeare not having 
either person in mind when he took up his pen, so God could use lines 
written by the apostle Paul in order to condition the way He is present 
to someone in the twenty-first century despite the fact that Paul may not 
have had present day readers in mind.
It is our suggestion that the Christian Scriptures are meant to facilitate 
acquaintance knowledge of the divine through “as if,” instrumental, and 
constitutive uses of the religious text. We suggest not that this is the sole 
purpose of Scripture, but rather that the function of Scripture attested to by 
the material in the Christian tradition referenced in the first section of the 
paper is underwritten by all three uses of a religious text. “As if” imagina-
tive engagement with the religious text is the most readily available, and 
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constitutive uses of the text are generally most potent. “As if” experiences 
prime one to experience the divine in the normal course of one’s life, but, 
given the nature of Scripture as divine communication, they also prime one 
to make instrumental and constitutive uses of the text in shared attention 
with God. There is a natural progression between “as if” engagement with 
the text, recognizing the instrumental qualities of Scripture, and entering 
into cooperative activity with the divine in which the God uses the text 
of the Scriptures to reveal Himself dyadically or triadically. The following 
passage from J. I. Packer could be readily interpreted as describing just such 
a progression.
In Bible study, we start as flies on the wall, watching God deal with men 
of the past, overhearing his words to them and theirs to him, noting the 
outcome of their faithful or faithless living. But then we realize that the God 
whom we were watching is watching us, and that we too are wholly in his 
hands, and that we are no less called and claimed by him than were the Bible 
characters. Thus we move into dialogical interpretation. Having seen what 
the text meant for its writer and first readers, we now see what it means for 
us. We study Scripture in the presence of the living God, as those who stand 
under both it and him. Each time it is as if he has handed us a letter from 
himself and stays with us while we read it to hear what our answer will be.20
In the next section, we will relate the above account to some contempo-
rary philosophical and theological literature, illustrating its potential for 
explicating theological claims about Scripture and comparing it to similar 
ideas by analytic philosophers of religion.
IV
In his dramatic spin on theological method, Kevin Vanhoozer, a systematic 
theologian, proposes seeing biblical interpretation like performing in a play 
with the canon of Scripture as the script. This performance interpretation 
involves one’s careful attention to the first three acts of the play (creation; 
God’s dealings with Israel; Jesus’s life, death, and resurrection) so that one 
can participate in the performance of the fourth act (the church’s Spirit-led 
activity), improvising in a manner consistent with the first three acts and 
in light of the final closing act (God’s consummation of all things).21
According to Vanhoozer, Scripture’s primarily narrative form not 
merely conveys historical or propositional information but also enables 
one to “see,” “taste,” or experience “something of the reality itself.” Fur-
thermore, this trains one in “seeing as” and “experiencing as,” that is, to 
see and experience the present world as the world presented in Scrip-
ture.22 In this way, Scripture is not only the script which one performs, but 
also the means by which one is trained for one’s role.
20J. I. Packer, Beyond the Battle for the Bible (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 1980), 23–24.
21Kevin J. Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine: A Canonical-Linguistic Approach to Christian 
Theology (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 2005), 2–3.
22Ibid., 284–285. 
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While Vanhoozer himself does not develop what it means for Scripture to 
convey “something of the reality itself,” this might be helpfully thought of 
in terms of Michael Rea’s concept of mediated experience. Borrowing from 
Derek Parfit’s notion of q-memory, Rea develops the idea that Scripture al-
lows the reader to gain a sense of what the presence of the divine is like 
through the way in which Scripture evokes mediated experiences of God. 
A mediated experience conveys what something is like in a way analogous 
to the way implanting someone else’s memories in one’s mind could convey 
a sense of what pineapple tastes like even if one had never tasted pineapple. 
The implanted memory mediates not merely propositional knowledge but 
the qualitative feel or phenomenal character of the thing itself.23
All of this resonates nicely with our explanation of Scripture facilitat-
ing pseudo-shared attention. In the same way that implanted memories 
of tasting different wines could train one’s palate without one ever having 
tasted any wine directly, pseudo-shared attention facilitated by Scripture 
could train one’s faculties to detect the presence of and to interact with 
the divine. In experiencing what it would be like if one were the paralytic 
forgiven by God, one is trained to enter into the drama of Scripture, to live 
as one forgiven by God.
Just as Vanhoozer’s performance interpretation and Rea’s mediated ex-
perience complements our category of pseudo-shared attention, so also 
Nicholas Wolterstorff’s concept of presentational discourse complements 
our constitutive use category, explaining how God might use a fixed text 
largely concerned with the past to share attention with a person here and 
now. Presentational discourse, as distinct from authorial discourse, in-
volves saying something by presenting to someone a previously authored 
text, whether authored by oneself or someone else.24
Consider two examples of how such a presentation might look. One 
might be reading a text privately and then get a sense that one’s atten-
tion is being drawn to a particular verse to which one is supposed to pay 
attention. If the prompting comes from God, a conscious prompting to 
attend to a passage is conveying a message by presenting that text for 
one’s notice. To do so by a conscious prompting is to make the presenta-
tion a potential instance of shared attention in which one attends to the 
presented text because one is cooperating with the prompting. Divine cau-
sation need not be something of which one is aware, but to prompt one 
consciously is to make the prompt a relational act with which one may or 
may not cooperate.
To use an even less esoteric example, suppose one is listening to the 
preaching of Scripture in a service and one has theological background 
beliefs such that one takes the proclamation of Scripture by an authorized 
23Michael C. Rea, “Narrative, Liturgy, and the Hiddenness of God,” in Metaphysics and 
God: Essays in Honor of Eleonore Stump, ed. Kevin Timpe (New York: Routledge, 2009).
24Nicholas Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse: Philosophical Reflections on the Claim that God 
Speaks (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 55–56.
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representative to be a means of divine speech.25 If God has, in fact, autho-
rized preachers to present the text of Scripture on His behalf in order that 
He Himself might engage the persons assembled, then God can present 
His Word through a fairly pedestrian experience as far as phenomenal 
fireworks are concerned. This situation would be much like Ray, in the 
case of Alex, handing notes to Alex through an assistant as she and Alex 
are cooking.
This case illustrates how the right background beliefs can allow one to 
engage in shared attention in a case that lacks any mystical tenor what-
soever. It is worth remembering that shared attention in human cases is 
quite flexible as regards the intensity of the presence conveyed. Staring 
into the eyes of one’s beloved at the altar is a much more potent experience 
than pointing out a notable bumper sticker while stuck in traffic, but both 
are cases of shared attention. The point of the shared attention account is 
not to assert the importance of esoteric experiences that involve the text, 
but rather to stress the relational utility of all sorts of shared attention, 
however plebian they may seem.
Not only is the work of Vanhoozer, Rea, and Wolterstorff consonant 
with our shared attention account, but this account helps make sense of 
their proposals. The shared attention account provides a framework that 
can incorporate the work of all three into a broader relational whole. Rea’s 
analogy to implanted q-memories is limited when taken as a complete 
account of the way God’s presence is communicated to a believer with 
Scripture. Q-memories communicate something of what it is like to taste 
pineapple or be in the presence of someone. What q-memories do not 
give one is actual experience of pineapples or an actual relationship with 
someone. A q-memory of someone may help one know how to interface 
with that person if he shows up, but it does not give one a relationship 
with that person, nor does acquiring a q-memory of someone one knows 
constitute interacting with that person. Yet the mediated experiences Rea 
has in mind might function to prime one for genuine shared attention, 
analogous to the way we have suggested pseudo-shared attention might 
prime one for genuine shared attention. Similarly, while Wolterstorff’s 
presentational discourse might explain how God could continue to speak 
through a fixed text, viewing such discourse within the framework of our 
25Such background beliefs might take various forms. For example, Luther and Calvin 
stress that god has sent preachers for the purpose of dispensing His Word so that preach-
ing, when faithful to Scripture, is the Word of God and Christ is really present. Thus, as 
noted earlier in section one, for Luther this belief enables one to expect to meet God in the 
proclamation of Scripture much like the Old Testament tabernacle functioned as a divinely 
ordained meeting place. Alternatively, Augustine’s view of divine providence and illu-
mination might also generate such expectation. Throughout Confessions, Augustine por-
trays diverse creaturely realities as vehicles of divine admonition, such as human advice 
(Monica and Vindicianus), secular books (Platonist writings), and Scripture (Antony and 
Augustine). For Augustine’s concept of admonitio in Confessions see Patrick E. Van Fleteren, 
OSA, “Augustine’s Ascent of the Soul in Book VII of the Confessions: A Reconsideration,” 
Augustinian Studies 4 (1974), 29–72. See the references from section one for the theologies of 
Luther, Calvin, and the Catholic Church.
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account emphasizes the way in which it can be constitutive of an encounter 
with God and helps to explain how it is one might come to be in a posi-
tion to have such an encounter and to hear such speech. Fundamentally, 
what our account brings to the table is the ability to unify the insights of 
Vanhoozer, Rea, and Wolterstorff in a relational framework that can make 
sense of the rich emphasis on the relational uses of Scripture found in all 
strands of the Christian tradition.
In conclusion, paying careful attention to the phenomenon of shared 
attention and to the way in which episodes of shared attention can incor-
porate a written text allows one to make sense of an affirmation found 
across the Christian tradition, that God is present in and continues to 
speak through the Scriptures. We hope to have provided a conceptual 
framework that captures many of the different ways that an inspired reli-
gious text can facilitate acquaintance knowledge of God and to have situ-
ated some of the recent developments in philosophy of religion and philo-
sophical theology within this framework in a way that helps make sense 
of these developments and relate them to one another.
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